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The main characteristics of EU’s market in fruits and vegetables are trend towards 
overproduction, price fluctuations, and relatively low protection and public support. The 
key instruments of the CMO are processing aids and support to Operational Funds. The 
current regulation has been more successful in encouraging improvements in quality 
and marketing than in stabilising prices and guaranteeing adequate income levels, 
mainly in fruits and in the great southern countries. The lack of common European 
action in the fields of import control and access to new foreign markets creates more 
pressure in the common market.  
 
The proposal of CMO’s reform comes after the great CAP’s change of 2003 -and its 
new paradigm- and the budget agricultural agreement until 2013. In practice, this 
reduces the real policy options for the new regulation. Main changes should occur in 
processing aids, where forces to decouple are strong; given that exports refunds are 
already phasing out and markets withdrawals are in decline. The main political defy is 
how to promote horizontal concentration through PO and to avoid the price crisis. To 
solve the issue of stability (or decline) of the human consumption, more can be done 
from the policy. The farmer’s influence in political decision seems weak. The scope for 
radical changes in fund distribution will be possible at national level.   
  
 
   1
THE REFORM OF THE CMO IN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES:  
A HOLISTIC APPROACH 
 
1.- INTRODUCTION 
There is not a complete and definitive theory about the policy reform yet. In the field of 
the agricultural policies, several theories have been used to explain the political 
economy of changes but the results light only some aspects on it. The core of the 
traditional analysis is based on neo-classical and public choice theories. Consequently, 
the main topics in this literature are the effects of different instruments over the 
efficiency (Buckwell et al., 1982) and the role played by agricultural lobbies in the 
special EU decision making-process (Senior Mello, 1984; Rieger, 1996). The most 
recent analysis focus on institutions and the mechanisms of institutional change. 
Although a theory of institutional change in the field of new institutional economics 
doesn’t exist (Compés, 2003), the great CAP reform of 2003 can be best understood 
using the main arguments of New Institutional Economics (NIE), as path dependence, 
adaptative efficiency and compensation (Compés, 2004). The power of farms lobbies 
seems to be smaller than before (Tracy, 1997), although it still must be taken into 
account, and the EU decision-making continues creating strong rigidities in the nature, 
ambition and scope of changes. Then, a holistic approach is needed. 
 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) in fruits and vegetables has been 
traditionally different from the main CAP’s CMO. Its instruments have been specific 
(with a relative pro-market orientation) and their reforms have occurred in different 
times. The results are a great competition in the European market of fruits and 
vegetables and a stability of CAP payments towards this sector. The Commission has   2
announced a reform of the current 1996’s CMO. During 2005 several documents of 
analysis and proposals have been released and even the European Parliament has 
discussed the problems and alternatives. The fresh sector is closer to the market than 
ever, their main issues come from market failures and some of them are outside of the 
CMO contents. 
 
The reform is not going to happen in an empty institutional framework. There is a path 
defined by the CAP reformed in 2003, by the EU position in –at the moment suspended- 
Doha Round and by the stand by in the process of European political integration. Using 
the theories referred before, the main predictions is that the demands of farmers trying 
to maintain or, improve, the status quo will have relatively little influence on the key 
topics, that the main changes will be consistent with the past and current path and that 
the changes will let countries in a relatively similar budget position ex-post. This means 
that the next reform will be more effective on the efficiency improvement that on the 
redistributive, being the countries the responsible of making changes in this field. Even 
if the final decision is not taken, the paper tries to explore the plausibility of these 
arguments given the known information. 
 
Besides, this paper seeks to explain why the next reform should pay attention to the 
most important market failures and why, if it doesn’t, the European institutions will 
show the unimportance of this CMO and some of their institutional failures. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section Two describes the main facts of the fruit and 
vegetable sector in EU. Section Three explains the current regulation and Section Four 
discusses the possible scenarios for the future reform. Finally, Section Five concludes.    3
 
2.- EU FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SECTOR 
The fruit and vegetable (F&V) sector is one of the key sectors in EU agriculture, 
accounting for 17% of EU final agricultural production (European Commission, 2006a). 
In some countries, notably Greece, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Italy and Belgium this share 
is even higher than the EU average, with Italy and Spain being the main F&V 
producers. The main products are apples, citrus and tomatoes. However, all countries in 
the EU have significant F&V production, and show some specialisation in specific 
products. During the 1900s there was a reduction in the number of F&V producing 
farms together with a reduction in fruit planted area while that for vegetable production 
increased. Total F&V demand has been relatively stable, though in recent years there 
has been a decrease in per capita consumption levels, with large variations between EU 
countries (Freshfel, 2004). Reasons behind this fall in F&V consumption include 
changes in life style towards convenience and perceived lost of flavour among 
consumers. Generally speaking, there is a trend towards overproduction. The average 
income level for fruit production farms is lower than the EU average and that for 
vegetable production farms. Price fluctuations are not unusual during certain (peak) 
periods in the marketing season.  
 
The EU is a key global trading partner in F&V, being the first world importer and 
second world exporter. Its current net trade balance is negative; the EU currently has the 
largest F&V world deficit accounting for a significant share of the EU total agro-food 
trade deficit. This trade deficit has increased since 2000, with 8.4 billion euros in fruits 
and 1.3 billion euros in vegetables in 2004. The main imported products in volume 
terms are apples, oranges, lemons and pears. Costa Rica, Ecuador and South Africa are   4
the principal sources of origin in terms of quantity, while the USA, Turkey and South 
Africa are the dominant sources in terms of value. The major export markets for the EU 
are, in terms of quantity, Russia, Switzerland and Egypt, and, in terms of value, Russia, 
Switzerland and the USA. For processed F&V, the mainly EU imports are from Turkey, 
Brazil and China, while EU exports are sent to the USA, Russia and Japan. 
 
3.- THE CURRENT REGULATION AND EFFECTS 
The Common Market Organisation for F&V differs from other CAP regulations applied 
to other agricultural products. The basic regulations covering fresh F&V, processed 
F&V, and a system of Community aids granted to certain citrus fruits were laid down in 
1996, although the basic regulation has been subjected to a number of amendments 
since 2000. For fresh products, the system is characterised by support to Producer 
Organisations (POs) under Operational funds as well as and intervention measures 
through market withdrawals compensated with Community funds. Processed products 
are guided by a system based on direct aids to producers according to national 
thresholds with penalties if processed volumes increase beyond fixed limits.  
 
The level of support to the F&V sector is one of the lowest in EU agriculture. There is 
little evidence regarding the size of economic transfers through price interventions. 
Anyway, the CAP expenditure on F&V was 1.8 billion euros in 2005, which accounted 
for 3.4% of the EAGGF – Guarantee section budget. Since 1996, public expenditure has 
remained relatively stable around 1.5 billion euros per year. The most important budget 
component is the expenditure allocated to Operational Funds, followed by processing 
aids to tomato producers, direct payments to banana producers, processing aids to citrus 
producers, aids to dried grapes and fig producers, processing aids to apple, pears and   5
prune produces, direct payments (since 2005) to nut producers, market withdrawals, and 
export subsidies. While the budget allocated to the Operational Funds has increased in 
recent years, market intervention expenditure has decreased. Most of the budget 
concentrates on Southern European countries. The Member States with higher shares of 
the total F&V budget in 2003 were Spain (31%), Italy (27%), France (17%) and Greece 
(13%). 
 
The assessment of the system reveals both positive and negative aspects. The share of 
total F&V production controlled by POs is close to 50%, which is a positive 
development but still below of that considered as desirable, taking into account 
increasing concentration at retail level. Moreover, this share is not uniform across EU 
producing regions, being lower in main producing countries such as Spain and Italy 
(Commission Européenne, 2004). Operational funds and programmes have been an 
interesting tool to promote supply concentration but producers’ groupings have yet to 
prove their attractiveness. Operational programmes have also promoted quality 
improvements and taken account of environmental concerns. Market withdrawals have 
dramatically decreased, which in theory is a good indicator towards stronger market 
orientation. Withdrawals have also been discouraged by the existing environmental 
constraints on biodegradation and the use of withdrawn products for animal feeding. 
However, the existing system has been ineffective in protecting producers from surplus, 
market disturbances and periodical price crises (Compés and Lázaro, 2006). Processing 
aids have been helpful in proving the agro-food industry with European raw materials. 
However, for some products, the processing industry has become an outlet for surplus in 
the fresh market. 
   6
If the objectives of the CMO are to stabilise prices, guarantee adequate income levels 
for producers and to encourage improvements in quality and marketing of their 
products, the CMO has not been very effective in achieving the first goal, but it has 
shown better results in the second aspect. The EU F&V sector is facing the challenge of 
(i) strengthening the POs by increasing their size, in particular in those regions where 
their presence is still weak; (ii) continuing to improve quality and environmentally 
friendly production; (iii) transforming market withdrawals into a mechanism used by 
PO for crisis management; and (iv) guaranteeing supplies to the agro-food industry. 
 
Furthermore, the CMO set aside other regulatory issues which affect the core of the 
F&V Community market. These issues basically refer to the access to the Community 
market for imports from third countries as well as to the existing non-tariff barriers 
faced by EU exports in third country markets. On the former, the entry price system has 
not been an effective guarantee for the Community preference –gradually eroded by the 
implementation of free trade agreements with significant actors in the world F&V 
market. Procedures for control compliance with quality and phytosanitary standards are 
ineffective and lack harmonisation. Regarding market access in third countries, the 
Community remains weak given the fact that each Member State has to undertake 
bilateral negotiations on strict requirements. 
 
4.- SCENARIOS FOR A NEW CMO 
The forthcoming Commission’s reform of the CMO reform is framed within a context 
characterised by (i) the CAP reforms in 2003 and 2004 which established a ‘single 
payment scheme’; (ii) the negotiating pressures on the EU under the Doha Development 
Agenda, which will cause a substantial reduction of border protection, domestic   7
support, and a possible phasing out of export subsidies; c) the EU’s financial framework 
which applies a  principle of financial neutrality on the F&V sector, at least until 2013; 
and d) a mainstream liberal policy coupled with a clear willingness to simplify the CAP 
(European Commission, 2005; Herranz-Garcia, 2005). 
 
These restrictions severely constrain F&V reform options. The CAP simplification and 
the pressures on the EU at the Doha negotiations jeopardise the continuation of both the 
processing aids and the market withdrawals. These measures can be considered as 
‘amber box’ policies that will have to be significantly reduced. The phasing out of 
export subsidies will not be so detrimental for EU F&V markets as the reductions in 
other forms of support. Though financial neutrality is not compulsory from Community 
legal texts, in practice, increase in public expenditure on certain F&V measures could 
only be the result of reallocating expenditure from other budget sections. In the field of 
current and dominant political principles, there is a tendency towards lower levels of 
public support and greater market orientation. 
 
The reform of the CMO should in principle be able to encourage and correct many of 
the current weaknesses in a coherent manner within the exiting restrictions. Though 
three reform scenarios could theoretically be foreseen –‘adjusted status quo’, ‘radical 
change’ and ‘intermediate reform’-, in practice the number of policy options is quite 
restricted. 
 
If market withdrawals continue under the present technical and budgetary conditions, 
their scheme should be simplified and made less complex to manage. Animal feeding 
could absorb substantial shares of withdrawn volumes. Phasing out withdrawals would   8
require the introduction of new measures for crisis management. The new system 
should maintain certain elements of the old withdrawal system, especially in terms of 
the management and use of the products. Key elements of the new regime would 
include: its funding –Community funding with national contributions-; its rules for 
activation, -percentage of price reductions related to production costs or to reference 
price levels; the use of withdrawn products –free distribution, animal feeding and 
promotion of consumption; and its management –the POs keeping a key role.  
 
On one hand, European Commission (2006b) considers four options to prevent and 
overcome short-term crises: status quo, insurance premiums against crises resulting 
from natural causes, a cofinanced fund or to incorporate specific arrangements between 
POs and the processing industry for dual use products. On the other hand, POs expect 
more help to face this kind of crises (COPA-COGECA, 2000).  
 
Community aid to POs under the operational funds should be maintained and even 
enhanced. Incentives should be granted to improve PO attractiveness and size. This can 
be reached by increasing the Community contribution over the existing 4.1% of the 
commercial production value and over the 50% of public contribution to the fund. 
Higher national contributions to the funds should be allowed for Member States where 
production marketed through POs is lower than the Community average.  
 
European Commission (2006b) stresses the importance of the setting up of inter-
professional agreements and the coherence between the CMO and the rural 
development programmes. POs consider that the operational funds are insufficient to   9
improve the situation of farm holdings of members of producer organisations and to 
achieve the objectives of the agri-environmental policy.  
 
The  ‘status quo’ scenario would consider the continuation of processing aids, but 
national ceilings should be adapted to the situation of the producing Member States. 
Nevertheless, these aids are not sustainable in the long term given the amount of budget 
they absorb and since they belong to the ‘amber box’ category of WTO subsidies. More 
realistic seems to be the ‘radical reform’ scenario where processing aids are partially or 
fully decoupled. These new payments allocated to the ‘single payment scheme’ would 
pose crucial problems of distribution: a) the allocation of the budget among Member 
States depending on the national ceilings, the volumes actually processed or the 
cultivated area; b) allocation among farmers depending on the payment received in a 
reference period, on a per hectare basis, or on other eligibility criteria. Full decoupling 
based on reference payments would give way to competition problems and would 
penalise farmers who produce for the fresh market. If a full decoupling approach 
involves lack of supply for the processing industry, the decoupling scheme should be 
limited by keeping the aids to double-purpose products during a five year transitional 
period. 
 
Any reform has to consider that many of the F&V market problems are horizontal in 
nature. For example, as for bilateral trade negotiations, there is a need for a political will 
of Community authorities to negotiate with third countries all questions related to 
market access, on harmonised bases. Similarly, quality and phytosanitary controls 
should be fully harmonised as well as the protocols signed with third countries where 
phytosanitary risks are possible. As for import duties and entry prices, the Community   10
should select those products most vulnerable to foreign competition as sensitive 
products. The special safeguard clause should be a more flexible and effective than it is 
nowadays. Finally, human consumption in the EU should be actively promoted, 
especially for young people, given the positive public effects of these products.  
 
Actually, European Commission (2006b) wants to take international commitments into 
account and even points out a “Co-development” option to support producer 
organisations in third countries. The need for Community standards for trade is 
considered since 1996 and now a new way is being explored to get it (synergy between 
public and private standards). In order to promote the consumption of fruits and 
vegetables, for better health and to fight obesity, an European Action Plan will be 
proposed.  
 
However, POs states that fruits and vegetables are considered as a bargaining currency 
in the Commission’s negotiations of bilateral and multilateral agreements and, as a 
consequence of this, European production is faced with an increasingly competitive 
market.  
 
A review of the 2003 reform is planned for 2008 under the “Health check". The review 
of the present financial framework for 2007-2013 will likely affect the CMO. Regarding 
budget impacts, eliminating withdrawals and restitutions -a “radical approach” 
outcome- will reduce F&V expenditure by 60 million euros. The budgetary savings will 
be larger if the expenditure allocated to operational funds is stabilized. Thus, the 
“radical reform” is expected to reduce F&V expenditure by 360 million euro in 2013 
compared to the “status quo” spending. Consequently, “radical reform” involves a   11
significant decrease in F&V budget, which would be clearly insufficient to meet the 
sector needs. The “intermediate” scenario could take advantage of the foreseen growth 
in operational funds under the “status quo” option plus a desirable increase in the 
percentage of Community funding (a 15% increase means +100 million euros per year). 
Savings in restitutions and withdrawals could be reallocated to crisis management, 
promotion and the ‘Observatory’ option. The decision on decoupling all processing aids 
or keeping some of them for double-purpose production will not change total 
expenditure but only its structure. The final decision would be taken by Member Status 
under procedures regulating the national envelopes. 
 
5.- CONCLUSION 
Explaining CAP reform’s process is still a great academic challenge. From the current 
literature, EU policy-making analysis and institutional change theory seems to offer the 
most useful insights. About the reform of the CMO in fruit and vegetables, promoted by 
the European Commission and foreseen for the 2007, this approach allows us to 
prospect, on one hand, that transformations aids will be converted in (total or partial) 
decoupling payments, the export restitutions removed and withdrawals removed or 
severely reduced and, on the other hand, that changes of budget among EU countries 
will be minor, although more freedom into each country to use funds will be allowed in 
the framework of national envelops. 
 
Farmers lobbies are pushing for keeping the status quo, but its position will have little 
influence over the Commission final proposal to the Council. We’re afraid that the new 
CMO approved by the Council will not be effective to correct the most important 
weaknesses affecting the sector in the future. For example, the lack of horizontal   12
concentration, related to that, the limits of farmers to integrate into the supply chain in 
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